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1A HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AVIATION CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO 
TERRAIN ACCIDENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN 1990-1998
INTRODUCTION
Aviation continues to be one of the safest forms of 
transportation, and with the help of modern technol-
ogy, is enjoying its best years ever. Still, accidents do 
occur, leaving investigators with the unenviable and 
often difficult task of identifying the causes, in the hope 
that they might be prevented or mitigated in the future. 
Using sophisticated forensic techniques and deductive 
reasoning; the work of an accident investigator is much 
like a detective sifting through clues to solve a mystery. 
Yet, even the most skilled investigator is often at a loss 
when trying to explain how a pilot could inexplicably fly 
a functioning aircraft into the ground. These so-called 
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents con-
tinue to beleaguer both civilian and military aviation.
So, what is “controlled” flight into terrain? After all, 
it seems inconceivable that a pilot would fly an aircraft 
into the ground while it was still controllable. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that getting investigators and 
researchers to agree on what is, and more importantly, 
what is not CFIT, is difficult at best. Nevertheless, while 
individual definitions of CFIT may vary, most would 
agree at some level that CFIT occurs when an airworthy 
aircraft, under the control of a pilot, is flown into terrain 
(water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the 
part of the pilot of the impending disaster (FAA, 2000).
Regardless of the nuances of each investigator’s personal 
definition, no one would deny that CFIT is a serious issue 
facing aviation today. In fact, if one were to use the FAA’s 
definition (above), the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps alone 
lost an average of ten aircraft per year to CFIT between 
1983 and 1995 (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995, 1997b). 
Likewise, between 1990 and 1999, 25% of all fatal air-
line accidents and 32% of worldwide airline fatalities 
(2,111 lives lost) have been attributed to CFIT (Boeing, 
2000). In fact, since 1990, no other type of accident 
has taken more lives in military or commercial aviation.
Given the accident data, no one would disagree that 
CFIT accidents in the military and commercial aviation 
warrant the attention they receive; but often forgotten 
are the even larger number of CFIT accidents that occur 
within general aviation (GA). To put it into perspective, 
while the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps lose on average 20-
30 aircraft annually for a variety of reasons, there were 
nearly 20,000 GA accidents between 1990 and 1999 
alone — including an average of almost 400 fatal ac-
cidents per year (NTSB, 2001). Unfortunately, neither 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), nor 
anyone else that we are aware of, has documented the 
number of CFIT accidents occurring in GA annually. 
But even if only 10% of the fatal GA accidents involved 
CFIT (well below the averages reported in commercial or 
military aviation), an alarming 40 fatal accidents per year 
could be attributed to this seemingly purest of human 
error accidents – and this does not even take into account 
those CFIT accidents in which a fatality did not occur.
CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)
On April 14, 1998, the FAA Administrator outlined the 
Agency’s safety agenda for GA, commercial aviation, and 
cabin safety. Referred to as Safer Skies, the goal for GA was 
to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 11-year period 
from 1996 to 2007. To accomplish that goal, six focus 
areas were targeted, one of which was CFIT. Armed with 
this mandate, a unique team of industry and FAA safety 
professionals, the Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT), was 
formed in the fall of 1998 to “identify and implement a 
data driven, cost/benefit focused, safety enhancement pro-
gram designed to reduce fatal general aviation accidents” 
(FAA, 2000, p.13) – in particular, those involving CFIT.
The team, using accidents identified by a previous 
study of CFIT performed by the Volpe Center (Volpe, 
1997), examined 195 CFIT accidents that occurred 
between 1993 and 1994 under a variety of operations 
including: 14 CFR Part 91 (personal and business flying), 
14 CFR Part 125 (privately operated transport aircraft), 
14 CFR Part 133 (rotary wing external operations), 14 
CFR Part 135 (air taxi), and 14 CFR Part 137 (agricul-
tural aerial application) operations. Employing a root 
cause analysis approach, the CFIT JSAT conducted a 
detailed analysis of the CFIT accidents and identified 
55 interventions aimed at addressing their causes. Ulti-
mately, the team selected a set of ten interventions that 
would be the most effective and feasible to implement. 
In no particular order they included the following:
•  Increase pilot awareness of accident causes.
•  Improve the safety culture within the aviation com-
munity.
•  Promote the development and use of low-cost terrain 
clearance and/or look ahead devices.
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•  Improve pilot training (i.e., weather briefing, equip-
ment, decision-making, wire and tower avoidance, and 
human factors).
•  Improve the quality and substance of weather briefs.
•  Enhance the Biennial Flight Review (BFR) and/or 
instrument competency check.
•  Develop and distribute mountain flying technique 
advisory material.
•  Standardize and expand the use of markings for towers 
and wires.
•  Use high-visibility paint and other visibility enhancing 
features on obstructions.
•  Eliminate the pressure to complete the flight where 
continuing may compromise safety.
Even the best interventions are useless if a plan for im-
plementing them is not drawn up. With that in mind, the 
FAA chartered a second team, including several members 
of the original CFIT JSAT, to develop an implementation 
plan for incorporating the recommendations of the CFIT 
JSAT into practice. The CFIT Joint Safety Implementa-
tion Team (JSIT) subsequently released a detailed imple-
mentation plan around eight areas that were in line with 
the original CFIT JSAT report (FAA, 2000). Included in 
their plan was an implementation strategy, the identifi-
cation of responsible parties and resources, and a list of 
milestones/completions dates to monitor the program.
U.S. Navy/Marine Corps CFIT
The military, like their civilian counterparts, has been 
confronted with CFIT almost since the inception of mili-
tary aviation. Nevertheless, few studies have systematically 
examined the full spectrum of human error associated 
with these often fatal accidents. Shappell and Wiegmann 
(1997a) did conduct one such study, examining 144 U.S. 
Navy/Marine Corps Class A1 accidents using an early 
version of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997b). Their analyses 
revealed several findings applicable to the intervention of 
CFIT, some of which were unexpected, given conventional 
wisdom in the area. What was consistent with previous 
work, however, was that many of the U.S. Navy/Marine 
Corps CFIT accidents were associated with spatial dis-
orientation and adverse mental states such as fatigue and 
the loss of situational awareness. In fact, to the extent 
that any particular causal category can be considered 
characteristic of a particular type of accident, it would 
be adverse mental and physiological states with CFIT.
While the confirmation that spatial disorientation and 
adverse mental states contribute to CFIT was important, 
what was particularly revealing from the Navy study was 
the large number of CFIT accidents associated with the 
willful violation of the rules by aircrew — a surprising 40% 
of the CFIT accidents examined. Upon further review, 
it appears that whether the violations involved personal 
readiness (e.g., self-medicating or simply violating crew 
rest requirements) or unsafe act violations (e.g., flying into 
a cloud bank when authorized for visual flight rules only), 
they were often the seminal event in the tragic sequence of 
events that followed. This finding was particularly relevant 
because many of the interventions proposed to prevent 
CFIT involved terrain avoidance and ground proximity 
warning systems (GPWS) that would seemingly be of little 
help if aircrew were willing to violate established safety 
practices. In fact, it was felt that over-reliance on GPWS 
and other related terrain avoidance systems might actu-
ally increase the likelihood that aircrew will push altitude 
limits in an attempt to get an edge in training or combat.
Even more interesting than the relationship of viola-
tions with CFIT were the marked differences between 
the error patterns associated with CFIT occurring 
during the day versus night. Much to the surprise of 
many within Naval aviation, nearly half of all CFIT 
accidents occurred in broad daylight during visual me-
teorological conditions (VMC). After all, it had been 
generally thought that most, if not all, CFIT occurred 
during the night or when visual cues were otherwise 
impoverished during instrument meteorological con-
ditions (IMC). It seemed reasonable therefore to ask 
whether any additional differences existed between day 
and night CFIT other than the obvious visual ones.
It is well known that when visual cues are limited, 
coordination among the crew and personnel external to 
the cockpit becomes paramount. It is not surprising then 
that the incidence of crew resource management failures 
was significantly higher among U.S. Navy/Marine Corps 
crews during night than during daytime CFIT accidents. 
Likewise, adverse physiological (e.g., spatial disorienta-
tion) and mental states (e.g., loss of situational awareness) 
were more prevalent at night than during the day. This 
was also anticipated, given that the lack of visual cues 
would presumably lead to spatial disorientation and the 
1 The U.S. Navy/Marine Corps considers an accident as Class A if  the total cost of  property damage (including all aircraft damage) is 
$1,000,000 or greater; or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs with direct involvement 
of  naval aircraft.
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loss of situational awareness. What was not expected was 
the rather large proportion of violations (nearly half of all 
the CFIT accidents examined) occurred mostly during the 
day. Given that violations almost invariably predicate other 
factors within the HFACS framework, this finding became 
a significant source of information for those designing 
systems to address CFIT in the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps.
A rationale for an HFACS analysis of GA accidents
Without question, the work of the CFIT JSAT and 
JSIT represent a landmark effort within civil aviation. 
However, while the interventions identified by the CFIT 
JSAT represent the views and opinions of experts in in-
dustry and the FAA, their findings might have benefited 
from a more focused human error analysis like that used 
with the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps accidents – particularly 
one that was not constrained by a relatively small sample 
of accidents. This is not to imply that the CFIT JSAT 
study was flawed. Quite the contrary, the CFIT JSAT 
was working within the logistical and time constraints 
they were given. As a result, they based their conclusions 
on a relatively small subset of accidents from a variety of 
aircraft operations rather than GA alone. This was done 
primarily because no one had systematically examined the 
GA accident record for CFIT accidents, perhaps due to 
the general lack of agreement on what a CFIT accident 
is. Since the JSAT convened, however, a joint Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)/Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Common Taxonomy Team 
has published a definition of CFIT accepted by many in 
the field (including the National Transportation Safety 
Board in the United States and ICAO) similar to that 
used by the CFIT JSAT. Specifically, the ICAO/CAST 
defined CFIT as an “inflight collision with terrain, wa-
ter, or obstacle without indication of a loss of control.”
The aim of this study therefore was to examine a 
large body of GA accidents using the CAST/ICAO 
criteria for CFIT. Then, after differentiating CFIT 
from non-CFIT accidents, a more detailed human error 
analysis could be performed. Given the success that the 
U.S. Navy/Marine Corps and other organizations have 
experienced using HFACS, it seemed reasonable to ap-
ply the HFACS framework to the GA accident database 
in the hope that similar results could be achieved. To 
familiarize the reader with the relevant aspects of the 
HFACS framework, it will be briefly reviewed here. 
Note however that a more complete description can 
be found elsewhere (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001a).
HFACS
It is generally accepted that aviation mishaps, like most 
accidents, do not happen in isolation. Rather, they are the 
result of a chain of events often culminating in the unsafe 
acts of aircrew. From Heinrich’s (Heinrich, Peterson, & 
Roos, 1931) axioms of industrial safety to Bird’s (1974) 
“Domino theory,” a sequential theory of accident causa-
tion has been embraced by many in the field. Particularly 
useful in this regard has been Reason’s (1990) relatively 
recent description of active and latent failures within 
the context of his “Swiss cheese” model of human error.
In general, Reason described four levels of human 
failure (organizational influences, unsafe supervision, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, and the unsafe acts of 
operators), each one affecting the next. To hear Reason 
explain it, many accidents have their roots high within 
the organization, at the level of the chief executive of-
ficer, president and vice-president(s). It is the decisions 
made by those at the top that often influence the middle 
managers and supervisors as they oversee the day-to-day 
operations of the organization. Ultimately, it is the op-
erators at the “pointy end of the spear” who inherit all 
the baggage of the organization  along with those that 
manage them as they perform their duties. Unfortunately, 
when the system breaks down and errors occur, accidents 
and incidents are the end result. So, if one wants to truly 
understand the causal genesis of an accident, they must 
peel the proverbial onion back, layer-by-layer, until the 
causal sequence of events is uncovered in its entirety. 
Yet, even as Reason’s seminal work revolutionized the 
way we in aviation and other industrial settings view the hu-
man causes of accidents, it did not provide the level of detail 
necessary to apply it in the real world. Therefore, drawing 
upon Reason’s (1990) original work, the human factors 
analysis and classification system (HFACS) was developed 
to fill that need (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000a, 2001a).
The HFACS framework describes 17 causal catego-
ries within Reason’s four levels of human failure (Figure 
1). However, because our previous work (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2001b) using GA accidents has shown that 
the causal factors typically populate only the bottom two 
tiers of HFACS (the preconditions for unsafe acts and the 
unsafe acts of operators) we will limit our discussion to 
them. A complete description of all four tiers can be 
found elsewhere (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000a, 2001a).
Unsafe Acts of Operators
The first level of HFACS describes those unsafe acts of 
operators that can lead to an accident. Perhaps unfairly 
referred to in aviation as aircrew/pilot error since many 
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unsafe acts do not involve aircrew, this level is where 
most accident investigations are focused and consequently, 
where the majority of causal factors are uncovered. The 
unsafe acts of operators can be loosely classified into one 
of two categories: errors and violations. While both are 
common within most settings, they differ markedly when 
the rules and regulations of an organization are considered. 
That is, errors can best be described as those activities that 
fail to achieve their intended outcome, while violations are 
commonly defined as behavior that represents the willful 
disregard for the rules and regulations. However, merely 
distinguishing between errors and violations does not pro-
vide the level of granularity required of most error analyses 
and accident investigations. Therefore, the categories of 
errors and violations were expanded here (Figure 1), as 
elsewhere (Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1982), to include 
three basic error types (decision, skill-based, and percep-
tual) and two forms of violations (routine and exceptional).
Errors
Decision Errors. Perhaps the most heavily investigated 
of all error forms, decision errors represent intentional 
behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan proves 
inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Often re-
ferred to as “honest mistakes,” this type of error can gener-
ally be grouped into one of three categories: procedural 
errors, poor choices, and problem-solving errors (Table 
1). Procedural decision errors (Orasanu, 1993), or rule-
based mistakes (as described by Rasmussen, 1982), occur 
during highly structured tasks of the sorts, if A, then do B, 
then do C. Aviation, particularly within the military and 
commercial sectors, by its very nature is highly structured, 
and consequently, much of pilot decision-making is pro-
cedural. In fact, there are very explicit procedures to be 
performed in virtually all phases of flight. Still, errors can, 
and often do, occur when a situation is either not recog-
nized or misdiagnosed and the wrong procedure is applied.
Even in aviation, however, not all situations have 
corresponding procedures that address them. Instead, 
many situations require that a choice be made among 
multiple response options. Consider, for instance, the 
pilot who unexpectedly confronts a line of thunder-
storms directly along the intended flight path. He or 
she can choose to fly around the weather, divert to 
another field until the weather passes, or penetrate the 
weather hoping to quickly transition through it. When 
����������������������������������������������������������������
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confronted with situations such as these, choice decision 
errors (Orasanu, 1993), or knowledge-based mistakes 
as they are otherwise known (Rasmussen, 1982), may 
occur. This is particularly true when there is insuffi-
cient experience, time, or other outside pressures that 
may preclude correct decisions. Put simply, sometimes 
individuals chose well, and sometimes they don’t.
Finally, there are occasions when a problem is not well 
understood and formal procedures or response options 
are not available. It is during these ill-defined situations 
that the construction of a novel solution is required. In a 
sense, individuals find themselves where no one has been 
before, and in many ways, must “fly by the seats of their 
pants.” Individuals placed in this situation must resort 
to slow and effortful reasoning processes where time is a 
luxury rarely afforded. Consequently, while this type of 
decision-making is more infrequent than other types, the 
relative proportion of errors committed is markedly higher.
Skill-based Errors. In contrast to decision errors, the 
second error form, skill-based errors, occur with little or no 
conscious thought. Just as little thought goes into turning 
one’s steering wheel or shifting gears in an automobile, 
basic flight skills such as stick and rudder movements and 
visual scanning often occur without conscious thought. 
The difficulty with these seemingly automatic behaviors 
is that they are particularly susceptible to attention and/or 
memory failures. In fact, attention failures have been 
linked to many skill-based errors such as the breakdown 
in visual scan patterns, task fixation, and the inadvertent 
activation of controls. Consider, for example, a crew that 
becomes so fixated on trouble-shooting a burned out 
warning light that they fail to monitor their altimeter 
and end up flying into the ground. Perhaps a bit closer 
to home, consider the hapless soul who locks himself out 
of the car or misses his exit while driving because he was 
either distracted, in a hurry, or daydreaming. These are 
both examples of attention failures that commonly oc-
cur during highly automatized behavior. While at home 
or driving around town, these attention failures may 
be frustrating, but in the air they can be catastrophic.
In contrast, memory failures often appear as omitted 
items in a checklist, place losing, or forgotten intentions. 
For example, many of us have forgotten to replace the 
gas cap after refueling the family car or failed to put the 
coffee in the coffeepot before turning it on. Likewise, it is 
not difficult to imagine that when under the stress of an 
inflight emergency, for example, or after a long, fatiguing 
flight, critical steps in a procedure can be missed. Yet, even 
when not particularly stressed, individuals have forgotten 
to set the flaps on approach or lower the landing gear.
Even the manner (or skill) with which one flies an 
aircraft (aggressive, tentative, or controlled) can affect 
safety. For example, two pilots with identical training, 
flight grades, and experience may differ significantly in 
the way they fly. That is, some pilots may fly smooth and 
effortlessly, while others are more forceful and rough on 
the flight controls. Both may be safe and equally proficient 
in the air; however, given certain scenarios, the techniques 
they employ could set them up for failure. Likewise, there 
are some pilots who are very safe in daytime VMC condi-
tions, but put them in a situation where they are flying at 
night or IMC and their skill quickly degrades to unsafe 
levels. In the end, such techniques are as much a factor 
of innate ability and aptitude as they are an overt expres-
sion of one’s personality, making efforts at the prevention 
and mitigation of technique errors particularly difficult.
Perceptual Errors. While, decision and skill-based 
errors have dominated most accident databases and 
have therefore been included in most error frameworks, 
perceptual errors have received comparatively less atten-
tion. No less important, perceptual errors occur when 
sensory input is degraded or “unusual,” as is often the 
case when flying at night, in the weather, or in other vi-
sually impoverished environments. Faced with acting on 
imperfect information, aircrew run the risk of misjudging 
distances, altitude, and decent rates, as well as a respond-
ing incorrectly to a variety of visual/vestibular illusions.
It is important to note, however, that it is not the il-
lusion or disorientation that is classified as a perceptual 
error. Rather, it is the pilot’s erroneous response to the il-
lusion or disorientation that is captured here. For example, 
many pilots have experienced spatial disorientation (often 
referred to as the “leans”) when flying in IMC. In instances 
such as these, pilots are taught to rely on their primary 
instruments, rather than their senses when controlling the 
aircraft. Still, some pilots fail to monitor their instruments 
when flying in adverse weather or at night, choosing in-
stead to fly using fallible cues from their senses. Tragically, 
many of these aircrew and others who have been fooled 
by illusions and other disorientating flight regimes have 
wound up on the wrong end of the accident investigation.
Violations
By definition, errors occur while aircrews are be-
having within the rules and regulations implemented 
by an organization and typically dominate most ac-
cident databases. In contrast, violations represent 
the willful disregard for the rules and regulations 
that govern safe flight and, fortunately, occur much 
less frequently (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995).
Routine Violations. While there are many ways to 
distinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms 
have been identified, based on their etiology. The first, rou-
tine violations, tend to be habitual by nature and are often 
tolerated by the governing authority (Reason, 1990). Con-
sider, for example, the individual who drives consistently 
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5-10 mph faster than allowed by law or someone who 
routinely flies in marginal weather when authorized for vi-
sual meteorological conditions only. While both certainly 
violate governing regulations, many drivers or pilots do the 
same thing. Furthermore, people who regularly drive 64 
mph in a 55-mph zone, almost always drive 64 in a 55-
mph zone. That is, they routinely violate the speed limit.
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” these viola-
tions are often tolerated and, in effect, sanctioned by 
authority (i.e., you’re not likely to get a traffic citation 
until you exceed the posted speed limit by more than 
10 mph). If, however, local authorities started hand-
ing out traffic citations for exceeding the speed limit 
on the highway by 9 mph or less, then it is less likely 
that individuals would violate the rules. By definition 
then, if a routine violation is identified, investigators 
must look further up the causal chain to identify those 
individuals in authority who are not enforcing the rules.
Exceptional Violations. In contrast, exceptional viola-
tions appear as isolated departures from authority, not 
necessarily characteristic of an individual’s behavior nor 
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example, 
an isolated instance of driving 105 mph in a 55-mph zone 
is considered an exceptional violation. Likewise, flying 
under a bridge or engaging in other particularly dangerous 
and prohibited maneuvers would constitute an excep-
tional violation. However, it is important to note that, 
while most exceptional violations are indefensible, they 
are not considered exceptional because of their extreme 
nature. Rather, they are considered exceptional because 
they are neither typical of the individual nor condoned 
by authority. Unfortunately, the unexpected nature of 
exceptional violations make them particularly difficult to 
predict and problematic for organizations to deal with.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Simply focusing on unsafe acts, however, is like focus-
ing on a patient’s symptoms without understanding the 
underlying disease state that caused them. As such, what 
makes Reason’s (1990) “Swiss cheese” model particularly 
useful in accident investigation, is that it encourages in-
vestigators to address the latent failures within the causal 
sequence of events as well as the more obvious, active 
failures described above. As their name suggests, latent 
failures, unlike their active counterparts, may lie dormant 
or undetected for hours, days, weeks, or even longer, until 
one day they adversely affect the unsuspecting aircrew. 
Historically, such latent failures have often been over-
looked by investigators, largely because the so-called “holes 
in the cheese” that adversely affect aircrew performance 
have not been clearly defined. To remedy this, HFACS 
describes two major subdivisions within the precondi-
tions for unsafe acts: Substandard conditions of operators 
and the substandard practices they commit (Figure 1).
Substandard Conditions of the Operators
Adverse Mental States. Being prepared mentally 
is critical in nearly every endeavor, perhaps more so 
in aviation. With this in mind, the first of three cat-
egories, adverse mental states, was created to account 
for those mental conditions that adversely affect per-
formance (Table 2). Principal among these are the loss 
of situational awareness, mental fatigue, and pernicious 
attitudes like overconfidence and complacency, which 
negatively affect decisions and contribute to unsafe acts.
Consider, for example, the individual who is men-
tally fatigued or suffering the effects of sleep loss. The 
likelihood that an error will occur given these precon-
ditions becomes more predicable. In a similar manner, 
overconfidence and other pernicious attitudes such 
as arrogance and impulsivity influence the likelihood 
that a violation will be committed. Clearly then, any 
framework of human error must account for these 
preexisting adverse mental states if a thorough under-
standing of the causal chain of events is to be realized.
Adverse Physiological States. The second cat-
egory, adverse physiological states, refers to those 
medical or physiological conditions that interfere 
with safe operations (Table 2). Particularly important 
to aviation are such conditions as visual illusions and 
spatial disorientation as described earlier, as well as 
physical fatigue and the myriad of pharmacological and 
medical abnormalities known to affect performance.
While the adverse effects associated with visual illu-
sions and spatial disorientation are well known among 
those in aviation circles, the effects of simply being ill 
on aircrew performance are less well known and often 
overlooked. Consider the pilot suffering from the com-
mon head cold. Unfortunately, most aviators view a 
head cold as only a minor inconvenience that can be 
easily remedied using over-the-counter antihistamines, 
acetaminophen, and other non-prescription medications. 
However, it is not the overt symptoms of the cold that 
flight surgeons are concerned with. Rather, it is the ac-
companying ear infection and the increased likelihood 
of spatial disorientation when entering IMC that is 
alarming — not to mention the side-effects of antihis-
tamines, fatigue, and sleep loss on pilot decision-making.
Physical/Mental Limitations. The final class of sub-
standard conditions involves individual physical/mental 
limitations (Table 2). Specifically, this category refers to 
those instances when mission requirements exceed the 
capabilities of the individual at the controls. For ex-
ample, the human visual system is severely limited at 
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night; yet, when driving an automobile, many drivers 
do not necessarily slow down or take additional pre-
cautions. Likewise, in aviation, while slowing down is 
not necessarily an option, increasing one’s vigilance for 
other aircraft or obstacles whose size or contrast interferes 
with their detection will often increase the safety margin.
Similarly, there are occasions when the time required 
to complete a task or maneuver exceeds an individual’s 
capacity. That is, while good pilots are typically noted 
for their ability to react quickly and accurately, individu-
als vary widely in their ability to process and respond 
to information. Still, even given individual differ-
ences, if any operator or pilot is required to respond 
quickly (as is the case in many aviation emergencies), 
the probability of making an error will likely increase.
In addition to the basic sensory and information pro-
cessing limitations described above, there are at least two 
additional instances of physical/mental limitations that 
need to be addressed, albeit often overlooked by most 
safety professionals. These limitations involve individuals 
who simply are not compatible with aviation, because 
they are either physically unsuited or do not possess the 
aptitude to fly. For example, some individuals simply do 
not have the physical strength or dexterity to operate in 
the unique aviation environment, or for anthropometric 
reasons, simply have difficulty reaching the controls. In 
other words, cockpits have traditionally not been de-
signed with all shapes, sizes, and physical abilities in mind.
Likewise, not everyone has the mental ability or 
aptitude for flying aircraft. Just as not all of us can be 
concert pianists or NFL linebackers, not everyone has 
the innate ability to pilot an aircraft – a vocation that 
requires the unique ability to make decisions quickly 
and respond accurately in life-threatening situations. 
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The difficult task for the safety professional is iden-
tifying whether physical abilities or aptitude might 
have contributed to the accident causal sequence.
Substandard Practices of the Operator
Clearly, then, numerous substandard conditions of 
operators can, and do, lead to the commission of unsafe 
acts. Nevertheless, there are a number of things that in-
dividuals do to themselves that set up these substandard 
conditions. Generally speaking, the substandard prac-
tices of operators can be summed up in two categories: 
crew resource management and personal readiness.
Crew Resource Management. Good communica-
tion skills and team coordination have been the mantra 
of industrial/organizational and personnel psycholo-
gists for decades. As one might expect, crew resource 
management has been a cornerstone of many aviation 
safety programs as well (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). As a result, the category 
of crew resource mismanagement was created to ac-
count for occurrences of poor coordination among 
personnel. Within the context of aviation, this includes 
coordination both within and between aircraft, with 
air traffic control personnel and maintenance control, 
as well as with facility and other support personnel as 
necessary. Likewise, good crew resource management 
includes coordination before and after the flight in the 
form of pre-flight briefings and debriefings as necessary.
Personnel Readiness. In aviation, or for that matter 
in any occupational setting, individuals are expected to 
show up for work ready to perform at optimal levels. 
However, in aviation as in other professions, individuals 
have been known to report for duty ill prepared, having 
violated crew rest requirements, bottle-to-brief rules, 
and rules associated with self-medicating. For example, 
when individuals violate crew rest requirements, they 
run the risk of mental fatigue and other adverse mental 
states that may ultimately lead to errors and accidents2. 
Still, not all personal readiness failures occur because of 
violations of governing rules or regulations. For instance, 
running 10 miles before piloting an aircraft may not be 
against any existing regulations, yet it may impair the 
physical and mental capabilities of the individual enough 
to degrade performance and elicit unsafe acts. Likewise, the 
traditional “candy bar and coke” lunch of the modern busi-
nessman might be common but may not be sufficient to 
sustain performance in the often complex and demanding 
environment of aviation. While there may be no rules 
governing such behavior, pilots must use good judgment 
when deciding whether they are ready and “fit” to fly.
METHOD
Data
General aviation accident data from calendar years 
1990-98 was obtained from databases maintained by 
the NTSB and the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data 
Analysis Center (NASDAC). In total, 17,994 GA acci-
dents were extracted for analysis. These so-called “GA” 
accidents actually included a variety of aircraft being flown 
under several different operating rules: 1) 14 CFR Part 
91 – Civil aircraft other than moored balloons, kites, 
unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons; 2) 14 
CFR Part 91F – Large and turbine-powered multiengine 
airplanes; 3) 14 CFR Part 103 – Ultralight vehicles; 4) 
14 CFR Part 125 – Airplanes with seating capacity of 20 
or more passengers or a maximum payload capacity of 
6,000 pounds or more; 5) 14 CFR Part 133 – Rotorcraft 
external-load operations; 6) 14 CFR Part 137 – Agri-
cultural aircraft operations. In addition, the database 
contained several accidents involving public use aircraft 
(i.e., law enforcement, state owned aircraft, etc.) and 
some midair accidents involving military aircraft. The 
distribution of each of these accident categories within 
the NTSB/NASDC databases is presented in Table 3.
Of the 17,994 accidents listed in Table 3, 157 inves-
tigations still remained incomplete at the time of this 
analysis and were eliminated from further consideration3. 
An additional 1,168 accidents were classified as due to 
undetermined causes and were also eliminated from the 
analysis. In addition, we were concerned with the apparent 
heterogeneity of the accident sample as depicted in Table 
3 even though all of the accidents listed can be found 
within the NTSB under the heading of “general aviation.” 
However, we were only interested in those accidents in-
volving aircraft operating under 14 CFR Part 91. After 
all, it is difficult to envision that large commercial aircraft 
being ferried from one airport to the next (operating 
under 14 CFR Part 91F) or aircraft being used to spread 
chemicals on a field (operating under 14 CFR Part 137) 
can be equated with small private aircraft being flown 
for personal or recreational purposes (operating under 
14 CFR Part 91). This left us with 16,510 accidents 
in the database. Next, the accidents were examined for 
 2Note that violations that affect personal readiness are not considered “unsafe act, violations” since they typically do not happen in the cockpit, 
nor are they necessarily active failures with direct and immediate consequences.
3 The NTSB classifies the results of accident investigations as either “preliminary” or “final” within their database. Only those designated as 
final by the NTSB as of May 30, 2002 were used in this study.
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aircrew-related causal factors. Again, we were only inter-
ested in those involving aircrew error, not those accidents 
that were purely mechanical in nature or those with other 
human involvement. This does not mean that mechanical 
failures or other sources of human error did not exist in 
the final database, only that some form of aircrew error 
was also involved in each of the accidents included in the 
final database. In the end, 14,086 accidents involving 
31,491 aircrew causal factors were included and submit-
ted to further analyses using the HFACS framework.
Causal Factor Classification using HFACS
Five GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma 
City area as subject matter experts and received roughly 
16 hours of training on the HFACS framework. All five 
were certified flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 
flight hours in GA aircraft (mean = 3,530 flight hours) as 
of June 1999 when the study began. After training, the 
five GA pilot-raters were randomly assigned accidents so 
at least two separate pilot-raters analyzed each accident 
independently. Using narrative and tabular data obtained 
from both the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pi-
lot-raters were instructed to classify each human causal 
factor using the HFACS framework. Note, however, 
that only those causal factors identified by the NTSB 
were classified. That is, the pilot-raters were instructed 
not to introduce additional casual factors that were not 
identified by the original investigation. To do so would 
be presumptuous and only infuse additional opinion, 
conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis process.
 After our pilot-raters made their initial classifica-
tions of the human causal factors (i.e., skill-based er-
ror, decision-error, etc.), the two independent ratings 
were compared. Where disagreements existed, the 
corresponding pilot-raters were called into the labora-
tory to reconcile their differences and the consensus 
classification was included in the database for further 
analysis. Overall, pilot-raters agreed on the classifica-
tion of causal factors within the HFACS framework 
more than 85% of the time (29,534 agreements; 4519 
disagreements), an excellent level of agreement consid-
ering that this was, in effect, a decision-making task.4
CFIT analysis
In addition to the analysis of human causal factors 
using HFACS, the five pilot-raters were instructed to 
independently classify each accident as CFIT or non-
CFIT using the definition provided by the ICAO/CAST 
Common Taxonomy Team that defined CFIT as the “in-
flight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without 
indication of a loss of control.” Accompanying the 
definition were a series of usage notes that further de-
fined the accident category. They included the following:
•  CFIT is used only for accidents occurring during 
airborne phases of flight.
•  CFIT includes collisions with those objects extending 
above the surface (for example: towers).
•  CFIT can occur during either Instrument Meteoro-
logical Conditions (IMC) or Visual Meteorological 
Conditions (VMC).
•  This category includes instances when the aircrew is 
affected by visual illusions (e.g., black hole approaches) 
that result in the aircraft being flown under control 
into terrain, water, or obstacles.
•  If control of the aircraft is lost (induced by crew, weather, 
or equipment failure), do not use this category.
•  Do not use this category for occurrences involving 
intentional flight into terrain (i.e., suicide).
•  Do not use this category for occurrences involving 
runway undershoot/overshoot.
Finally, there was some concern that intrinsic 
differences between controlled flight into “terrain” 
(water or the ground) and controlled f light into 
“obstacles” (e.g., telephone wires, buildings, or other 
man-made structures) might exist. For this reason, 
pilot-raters were also instructed to differentiate 
CFIT accidents along this dimension as well.
������ ��� ������������� ��� ���������� ������ ����
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4 The measure of agreement was a combined analysis of all accidents coded under the NTSB classification of “general aviation” and therefore 
includes accidents other than 14 CFR Part 91 as described above. A breakout by 14 CFR Part 91 alone was not possible at this time but there 
is no reason to believe that the level of agreement would change appreciably.
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RESULTS
The GA data were initially examined to determine 
the extent to which each HFACS causal category con-
tributed to GA accidents overall. To accomplish this, the 
frequency and percentage of GA accidents associated with 
each HFACS causal category were calculated. However, 
to avoid over-representation by any single accident, each 
causal category was counted a maximum of one time per 
accident. In this way, the count acted as an indicator of 
the presence or absence of a particular HFACS causal cat-
egory for a given accident. The data were calculated in this 
manner with the knowledge that most aviation accidents 
are associated with multiple causal factors, including on 
some occasions, multiple instances of the same HFACS 
causal category (e.g., multiple decision errors may have 
been committed). However, only by analyzing the data in 
this way could a true representation of the percentage of 
accidents associated with each causal category be obtained.
The number and percentage of accidents associated 
with at least one instance of a particular HFACS causal 
category can be found in Figure 2, with one notable ex-
ception. As with post-hoc data examined in other venues 
(e.g., the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Air 
Force, etc.), it proved too difficult to differentiate between 
routine and exceptional violations using narrative data 
from the NTSB and NASDAC. As a result, pilot-raters 
were instructed to use the parent causal category of “vio-
lations,” rather than distinguish between the two types.
The overall analysis of 14 CFR Part 91 accidents re-
vealed a picture of human error within GA that was not 
possible before the development of HFACS. For instance, 
the data indicate that skill-based errors (73.5% of the 
14,086 GA accidents) were the most frequently cited 
unsafe act committed by aircrew, followed by decision 
errors (35.1%), violations (14.3%), and perceptual errors 
(7.7%). The finding that the unsafe acts of operators ac-
counted for the majority of causal factors in the database 
was anticipated, given the emphasis of most investiga-
tions. However, the preconditions for unsafe acts were 
no less important. In fact, physical/mental limitations 
were among the most prevalent of all the HFACS causal 
categories cited, contributing to 18.3% of the accidents 
examined. The remaining preconditions for unsafe acts, 
in order of prevalence, were CRM failures (10.6%), 
adverse mental states (5.3%), adverse physiological 
states (2.6%), and personal readiness failures (2.1%).
The preceding analysis of the data represents a “quick 
look” at the human error issues facing GA. Yet, alone it 
provides little insight into the pattern of errors associated 
with any specific type of accident, like CFIT. The next 
step, therefore was to investigate what differences, if any, 
existed in the type and frequency of errors committed by 
aircrew involved in CFIT versus those observed in other 
������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
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types of accidents. An examination of the GA accidents 
revealed that 1,407 (roughly 10 percent), of the 14,086 
accidents were classified as CFIT by our pilot-raters using 
the criteria established by the CAST/ICAO Common 
Taxonomy Team. While the actual number and percentage 
of accidents associated with CFIT is a new and important 
finding in and of itself, the larger question was whether 
there were any differences in the pattern of errors asso-
ciated with CFIT and the 12,679 non-CFIT accidents.
An inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the propor-
tion of accidents associated with each HFACS causal 
category varied markedly between CFIT and non-CFIT 
accidents. The difficulty was in determining which dif-
ferences, if any, were actually significant, and more 
importantly, which were meaningful. Traditionally, 
nonparametric statistics, like Chi-square, are used to 
measure the association between two nominal (indicator) 
variables. However, Chi-square, like many other non-
parametric statistics, are fraught with problems where 
large data sets are involved. That is, as the sample size 
increases, the more likely it is to find significance where 
only small, perhaps trivial, differences actually exist.
One option is to use a measure of association that is not 
affected by sample size, like the odds ratio. Commonly 
used in epidemiology, the odds ratio is typically used to 
measure the degree of the association between two vari-
ables or the ratio of the odds of suffering some particular 
fate given certain characteristics. Consider, for example, 
the odds of surviving an automobile accident with or 
without using a seatbelt5. If drivers suffer fatal injuries 
20% of the time when they use their seatbelts, the odds 
of dying in a car accident while wearing a seatbelt are 
0.25 (0.2 die with their seatbelt on / 0.8 survive with 
their seatbelt on). In contrast, 35% of drivers not wear-
ing seatbelts die in automobile accidents, giving odds of 
0.538 (0.35 die with their seatbelt off / 0.65 live with 
their seatbelt off ). Thus, the odds ratio is 0.465 (0.25/
0.538). In other words, you have a 0.465 times higher 
chance of dying in an automobile accident with your 
seatbelt on than without it. Arguably, this is hard to 
interpret, so with numbers of less than one we typically 
calculate the inverse of the odds ratio, which in this case 
equals 2.15 (1/0.465). This means that you would be 
2.15 times more likely to die in an automobile accident 
if you did not wear your seatbelt than if you had worn it.
Another option is to dispense with traditional non-
parametric statistics altogether, and compare the differ-
ences observed in the percentage data associated with 
5 These data are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. They are not the official statistics of  the NTSB or Bureau of  Transportation 
Statistics.
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each HFACS causal category for CFIT and non-CFIT 
accidents against some preset level considered “operation-
ally relevant.” But, who is to say which differences are 
operationally relevant, and which are not? After all, is a 
difference between CFIT and non-CFIT accidents of 
five percentage points more operationally relevant than 
say three or four percent — or perhaps, one should use a 
larger percentage like 10 percent? In the end, the decision 
is subjective and often left to the researcher to defend.
Regardless of whether one uses traditional statistics or 
simply chooses an operationally relevant difference, there 
really is no right or wrong answer. Therefore, left without 
a clear-cut option, we chose to use the more objective ap-
proach of nonparametric statistics (Chi square and odds 
ratios) but with a considerably more conservative p value 
(p<.001) than is typically reported in other studies (p<.05 
is generally regarded as acceptable within the psychological 
literature). Our intention was to capitalize on the objec-
tive power of statistics while minimizing the problems 
associated with potentially inconsequential findings.
Using this approach, the results of the Chi-square analy-
sis are presented for each HFACS causal category in Table 4. 
Also included are the corresponding odds ratios with a 95% 
confidence interval as a measure of the relative risk of CFIT 
given a particular causal category. For illustrative purposes, 
the results of the analyses in Table 4 have been translated 
into Figure 3 by shading the corresponding HFACS 
causal categories where significant differences existed.
In some ways, the pattern of human error was similar 
for CFIT and non-CFIT accidents, as skill-based and 
decision errors were the most frequently cited causes 
of both. However, important differences did exist. For 
instance, almost one-third of all CFIT accidents were 
associated with violations of the rules compared with 
just over 12% for non-CFIT accidents, yielding an 
odds ratio of 3.264. Likewise, personal readiness fail-
ures (e.g., failing to obtain adequate rest, self medicating, 
etc.), arguably another type of violation only occurring 
external to the cockpit, were over four times more likely 
during CFIT accidents. Adverse mental states (odds ra-
tio = 2.907) and perceptual errors (odds ratio = 1.847) 
were also more prevalent during CFIT than non-CFIT 
accidents. In contrast, physical/mental limitations 
(e.g., the inability to maintain control of the aircraft) 
and failures of crew resource management were more 
likely to occur during non-CFIT than CFIT accidents6.
The Effect of Visual Conditions on CFIT
When discussing CFIT, many safety professionals have 
suggested that these accidents typically occur at night or 
in adverse weather when pilots simply may not be able to 
see their impending collision with the terrain or obstacles. 
However, it now appears that more of these accidents 
occur during VMC (n=867; 61.6%) than IMC (n=501; 
35.6%)7, although the percentage that occurred in VMC 
was considerably less than that observed for non-CFIT 
����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 6When interpreting an odds ratio of less than 1, the inverse of the ratio is calculated. For example, the odds ratio associated with physical/
mental limitations was 0.639, indicating that physical/mental limitations were 1/0.639, or roughly 1.5 times more likely to occur during 
non-CFIT than CFIT accidents.
 7The weather conditions at the time of the accident were unknown for 39 (2.8%) CFIT accidents and 62 (0.5%) non-CFIT accidents, while 
the lighting conditions were unknown for two (0.1%) CFIT and four (0.003%) non-CFIT accidents. Weather and lighting combined were 
used to identify visual conditions (impoverished versus clear). When the data were examined in this manner, visual conditions were completely 
unknown for 27 (1.9%) CFIT and 43 (0.3%) non-CFIT accidents. Percentages reported in the text and Figure 5 reflect these data.
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accidents (Figure 4, upper left). Furthermore, it appears that 
a greater percentage of CFIT accidents occur during the 
day (n=923; 65.6%) than at dawn or dusk (n=82; 5.8%) 
or even at night (n=400; 28.4%; Figure 4, upper right). 
However, simply looking at lighting conditions without 
considering the weather, or vice-versa, really only presents 
part of the picture. Therefore, we combined the weather 
with the lighting information and examined the percent-
age of CFIT and non-CFIT accidents occurring during 
visually impoverished (i.e., accidents occurring either at 
night or in IMC) and clear daytime conditions. Yet, even 
when the data were examined in this way (Figure 4, lower 
panel), nearly as many CFIT accidents occurred in clear 
daytime conditions (n=685; 48.7%) as during visually im-
poverished conditions (n=695; 49.4%). While this finding 
might not have been predicted by those in the GA commu-
nity, it was not unprecedented given the previous findings 
of Shappell and Wiegmann (1997a) using U.S. Navy/
Marine Corps accident data. In contrast, considerably 
more non-CFIT accidents occurred in clear conditions.
Although there appears to be very little difference in 
the number of accidents that occurred during clear and 
visually impoverished conditions, the question remains 
whether the pattern of human error differed appreciably 
for the different visual conditions. Indeed, the data pre-
sented in Figure 5 suggest that in some ways the underlying 
causes are intrinsically different. For instance, those CFIT 
accidents that occurred during visually impoverished 
conditions were more often associated with violations 
of the rules, adverse physiological states, physical/mental 
limitations, and poor crew resource management (Table 
5). Perhaps not surprising, aircrew involved in a CFIT ac-
cident during visually impoverished conditions were well 
over six times more likely to have committed a violation 
of the rules. They were also five times more likely to have 
been affected by adverse physiological states (e.g., misjudg-
ing altitude and spatial disorientation) and more likely 
to mismanage their resources (e.g., failing to obtain an 
adequate preflight weather brief or update prior to depar-
ture). Indeed, one could almost envision a crew that fails 
to obtain a weather update prior to takeoff (crew resource 
management) and then encounters weather enroute. 
Then, after choosing to continue into IMC when VFR 
only (violation), they end up misjudging their altitude 
(adverse physiological state) and collide with the terrain.
 In contrast to visually impoverished conditions, 
trying to understand why a pilot would collide with 
terrain in clear daytime conditions is somewhat more 
puzzling. However, the odds ratio data may provide 
a clue. It appears that pilots involved with CFIT in 
clear daytime conditions are well over two times more 
likely (1/0.436 = 2.29) to have committed a skill-based 
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error than those involved in other types of accidents. 
Given that skill-based behavior is often the result of 
inattention and simple stick-and-rudder skills, perhaps 
they were either not proficient or simply preoccupied 
with other things. In either event, the human errors as-
sociated with CFIT in clear and visually impoverished 
conditions are fundamentally different with regard to 
the types of human error more often associated with it. 
Collision With “Terrain/water” Versus Collision 
With “Obstacles”
There was some concern that a definition of CFIT that 
equates collision with terrain/water with collision with 
obstacles might be akin to “comparing apples and oranges,” 
at least from a human factors perspective. To address this 
concern, we examined the pattern of human errors associ-
ated with collision with terrain/water (n=826) and that 
with obstacles (n=581). An inspection of Figure 6 revealed 
very few differences between the two types of CFIT, in-
cluding no differences among the preconditions for unsafe 
acts. In fact, the only differences were among skill-based 
and perceptual errors (Table 6). Specifically, skill-based 
errors were nearly two times more likely (odds ratio = 
1.759) when the collision was with the terrain/water. In 
contrast, collision with obstacles was more often associ-
ated with perceptual errors (odds ratio = 1/0.574 or 1.74).
DISCUSSION
Accidents and the tragic loss of life that often accom-
pany them have confronted aviation since the first flights 
of the Wright Brothers. Still, when a healthy pilot flies a 
perfectly good aircraft into the ground, the pundits grow 
eerily quiet. Of all the ways one can crash an aircraft, 
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is arguably the 
hardest to explain and therefore begs the question, “Why 
would an experienced aviator fly a perfectly good aircraft 
into the ground” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995, 1997a)?
Historically, several explanations for CFIT have been 
offered such as the loss of visual cues at night or during 
IMC, inattention or distraction during periods of high 
workload, or simply poor aviation skills. In response, 
civilian and military organizations have instituted more 
conservative altitude restrictions, provided additional 
safety awareness training, and employed the use of alti-
tude and ground proximity warning systems (GPWS).
Undeniably, these intervention strategies have helped 
save many lives by either requiring aircrews to maintain 
greater separation from hazardous terrain or by alerting 
flight crews to an impending collision with the terrain. 
However, their utility in the realm of general aviation var-
ies dramatically from that of their military or commercial 
aviation counterparts. For instance, most GA enthusiasts 
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ted. Significant differences (p<.001) are represented by shaded boxes.
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do not have the monetary resources of the military or 
commercial sector, making many new technologies such 
as GPWS difficult to afford. Simply enforcing existing 
Federal Air Regulations is likely not the answer either. After 
all, there are more GA aircraft in the U.S. than there are 
military and commercial aircraft combined; not to men-
tion, many of these GA aircraft fly in unrestricted airspace, 
making enforcement a difficult prospect, indeed. So, if the 
availability of terrain warnings or the enforcement of more 
conservative altitude restrictions alone are not likely to 
have a significant affect on GA CFIT, what is the answer?
A major step in addressing this challenge was taken 
by the GA CFIT JSAT and JSIT. In their final report to 
the Joint Steering Committee, the CFIT JSAT identi-
fied 55 intervention strategies, finally settling on a “top 
10” that were submitted to the CFIT JSIT. The primary 
goal of the CFIT JSIT was to develop an implementa-
tion strategy that identified the resources, responsible 
parties, milestones for implementing the interventions, 
as well as metrics for tracking their success. In the end, 
the CFIT JSIT produced a detailed and prioritized 
implementation plan8 with the following components: 
1. Streamline equipment installation. Terrain avoid-
ance and other equipment have been available for 
some time within military and commercial aviation. 
However, for many GA pilots, such technology is out 
of reach due to cost concerns and the simple fact that 
in many cases new technology in use within military 
and commercial aviation has not been modified for 
GA aircraft. Given “low cost” displays that enhance 
terrain awareness and reduce pilot workload are being 
developed, perhaps the process for certifying the new 
������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
technology can be streamlined within the FAA.
2. Enhance pilot training for CFIT awareness and 
prevention. Specifically, the JSIT recommended that 
Practical Test Standards, Knowledge Tests, and other 
training materials be modified to include knowledge 
of how CFIT occurs and how to prevent it.
3. Establish a General Aviation Safety Council. The idea 
was to establish a council of safety experts from the 
government (FAA, NTSB, and NASA) and industry to 
act as a vehicle for launching safety-related programs 
and distributing information to the GA community 
in a more expeditious and efficient manner.
4. Increase pilot awareness on CFIT accident causes. 
The JSIT proposed establishing a Web page on the 
FAA’s Internet site that would increase pilot awareness 
of the causes of CFIT and relay first-person accounts 
of “near-CFIT” accidents. Also included here was a 
recommendation for the NTSB to begin classifying 
accidents as CFIT or non-CFIT within their accident 
reports to track trends in the data and facilitate future 
analyses.
5. Develop education, awareness, and training modules 
for CFIT prevention. This area focuses on the devel-
opment of several training modules centered about 
CFIT awareness and risk-taking behavior similar to the 
widely disseminated personal minimums checklist.
6. Standardize and expand requirements for enhancing 
the visibility and detection of wires, support struc-
tures, and towers. Surprisingly, there are no standard-
ized criteria for the marking of obstacles or hazards. 
Therefore, it was proposed that a national standard 
for marking wires and towers be developed, as well as 
 8For a more thorough discussion of each of these components, see Federal Aviation Administration (2000). General aviation controlled flight 
into terrain Joint Safety Implementation Team: Final Report.
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a passive (e.g., visual markings) and active (e.g., avion-
ics equipment capable of sensing obstacles) means of 
detecting wires, towers and other obstacles.
7. Develop routes for GPS waypoints for mountain 
passes. While somewhat controversial, it was recom-
mended that with the advent of GPS, that waypoints 
for safely flying through mountain passes could be made 
available. Some have argued, though, that this would 
only convey a false sense of ease to pilots attempting 
the complex and often demanding task of traversing 
through high-altitude mountain passes.
8. Enhance digital user access terminals (DUATS) to 
provide density altitude advisories. In particular, pilots 
would receive a density altitude advisory at both the 
departure and destination airports, as well as areas 
along their intended route.
Given the scope and detail of the analyses conducted 
in this study using the HFACS framework with a con-
siderably larger pool of accidents, it seemed reasonable 
to examine which of the interventions identified by the 
CFIT JSAT and JSIT would address the human error 
associated with CFIT. Recall that, in the analysis of all 
GA accidents occurring between 1990-98, skill-based 
errors were associated with nearly 3/4 of all the accidents, 
regardless of whether they were CFIT or not. Skill-based 
errors were followed by decision errors (35.1%), physical/
mental limitations (18.3%), and violations of the rules 
(14.3%). It should come as no surprise then, that skill-
based errors (76.3%) and decision errors (33.5%) were 
also the most frequently cited form of human errors as-
sociated with CFIT accidents as well. More interesting, 
however, were those human errors that differentiated 
CFIT from non-CFIT accidents. For instance, while 
violations and perceptual errors contributed to only 
12.4% and 7.2% of the non-CFIT accidents, respec-
tively, they contributed to 31.6% (violations) and 12.5% 
(perceptual errors) of CFIT accidents. Likewise, adverse 
mental states and personal readiness failures were more 
likely to occur during CFIT than non-CFIT accidents. 
In fact, CFIT accidents were over four times more likely 
to involve a personal readiness failure and three times 
more likely to involve at least one violation of the rules.
So, how do these findings reconcile with the interven-
tions and implementation plan proposed by the CFIT 
JSAT and JSIT? First, it is hard to overlook the fact that 
three out of four CFIT and non-CFIT accidents were 
associated with skill-based errors, even though there 
were no real differences between the two. Certainly 
then, improving basic flight skills through improved 
primary flight and recurrent training would likely have 
an impact on all types of accidents, including CFIT. 
But, in many instances, skill-based errors are that last 
fatal flaw before impacting the ground – particularly 
among CFIT accidents. The real culprit in CFIT typi-
cally lies farther upstream in the causal chain of events 
among areas like violations of the rules, perceptual errors, 
adverse mental states, and personal readiness failures.
An examination of the CFIT JSIT’s implementation 
plan reveals that many of the recommendations map very 
well onto these four human error causal categories. For 
instance, it is quite likely that simply by increasing a pilot’s 
awareness of the hazards of excessive risk-taking and other 
causes of CFIT (numbers 2, 4, and 5 above) we can begin 
to reduce the number of violations and personal readiness 
failures committed by GA pilots. Perhaps this is where 
the establishment of a General Aviation Safety Council 
could help as well by organizing the distribution of train-
ing and informational materials directed at improving 
pilot awareness of the issues surrounding CFIT. Indeed, 
if we could somehow convince GA pilots that they are 
four times more likely to die if they continue into IMC 
when they are rated for VFR flight only, a significant 
reduction in the number of fatal accidents might be real-
ized (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2002). Perhaps then, they 
might think twice before taking the chance of having an 
accident. In much the same way, we can provide actual 
data, rather than anecdotes and opinions, regarding the 
hazards of flying without adequate rest or when tired 
and fatigued. Indeed, while an individual GA pilots may 
ignore anecdotes as rare events that only happen to the 
other guy, the statistics may convince them otherwise.
Consistent with previous work in the area (Jensen & 
Benel, 1977; Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990), the data 
presented here suggest that any training aimed at the 
reduction of CFIT should also focus on adverse mental 
states like overconfidence, self-induced pressure, and a 
variety of other hazardous attitudes – particularly when 
adverse mental states were nearly three times more likely 
to be associated with CFIT than non-CFIT accidents. 
Furthermore, because violations and personal readiness 
failures are often associated with adverse mental states, 
one would expect that many of the same interventions 
would be effective in combating adverse mental states as 
well. Consider, for example, the pilot who first learns to 
fly. It’s very unlikely that a pilot with less that 100 hours 
total flight time would press through the weather or try 
flying through a mountain pass. But give that same pilot 
three or four hundred hours in the aircraft and the con-
fidence will build to a point where they might be more 
likely to take risks not previously considered. The diffi-
culty is teasing apart skill from overconfidence, because as 
skill improves overconfidence will likely increase as well. 
The unfortunate thing is that a pilot’s overconfidence 
may lead them into a situation that their current skill 
set cannot get them out of. Now, if we could somehow 
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control that pilot’s overconfidence either through en-
hanced training or increased awareness of the hazards 
associated with excessive risk taking (see numbers 2, 4, 
and 5 above) then maybe we can reduce the number of 
violations and personal readiness failures committed by 
GA pilots. Ultimately, this would have the effect of driving 
down the number of CFIT accidents in general aviation.
So, how will the interventions developed by the CFIT 
JSAT affect those CFIT accidents associated with percep-
tual errors and adverse mental states? Arguably, the small 
percentage of CFIT accidents associated with these two 
error forms was unexpected. After all, in many corners, 
CFIT has often been attributed to spatial disorientation 
and visual illusions that occur during visually impoverished 
environments such as those experienced during IMC or at 
night. Nevertheless, only 12.5% of the CFIT accidents ex-
amined occurred as the result of perceptual errors. In fact, 
our analyses revealed that nearly as many CFIT accidents 
occurred during daytime VMC as did those occurring in 
visually impoverished conditions (i.e., during IMC or at 
night). It is unclear then, to what extent using technology 
such as a GPWS or other terrain avoidance technology 
(number 1, above) would help. While it can be reasonably 
argued that terrain displays and other warning systems 
would address some of the problems associated with spa-
tial disorientation at night or in the weather, there were 
only 74 (10.6%) CFIT accidents in which a perceptual 
error was committed in visually impoverished conditions. 
Another 101 or 14.7% of the perceptual errors occurred 
during broad daylight where presumably the errors were 
simply misjudging airspeed and altitude or simply not 
seeing obstacles due to inherent limitations in the visual 
system. What may help in these instances would be the 
use of high visibility paint and other enhancing features 
on obstructions (number 6, above) combined with im-
proved visual scan and safety awareness. Nevertheless, 
the development of a low-cost terrain clearance or “look 
ahead” device (number 1, above) may be worth examining.
It should also be noted that, although crew resource 
management failures were infrequent, when they were 
associated with CFIT accidents they were more than four 
times more likely to occur during visually impoverished 
conditions than during daytime VMC. Upon closer in-
spection, these failures were often the result of GA pilots 
not taking advantage of all the resources at their disposal 
prior to departing or while en route rather than the tra-
ditional crew resource management failures associated 
with communication among multi-place crews. Indeed, 
many of these failures were the result of not getting an 
adequate weather update prior to departing or in the air. 
While none of the CFIT JSIT’s eight areas specifically 
deal with this particular issue (albeit, number 8 above, 
does address the need to provide density altitude infor-
mation), it would not be difficult to emphasize the need 
for frequent weather updates and encourage the use of 
Flight Service Stations while en route within the train-
ing recommended to address CFIT. Indeed, the CFIT 
JSAT did include improving the quality and substance 
of weather briefs in their “top-10” list of interventions, 
but it did not make the final list published by the CFIT 
JSIT. Perhaps if they had the information presented 
here, it might have been included in the final report.
Finally, the CFIT JSAT recommended the develop-
ment of mountain flying advisory materials. While on 
the surface this makes sense (i.e., the perception that 
pilots are simply flying into mountains), not all CFIT 
occur in mountainous terrain. For that matter, a number 
of accidents are not even controlled flight into “terrain” 
in the classical sense. That is, 581 (41%) were actually 
controlled flight into “obstacles.” Arguably, there were very 
few differences in the pattern of human error associated 
with each, with the noted exception of skill-based errors 
that were more likely during collision with terrain/water 
and perceptual errors that were more likely during collision 
with obstacles (presumably because the pilot could not 
perceive them). In both cases, however, the odds ratios 
were not large (i.e., they were less than 2). Perhaps the 
plan to develop routes for GPS waypoints for mountain 
passes (number 7, above) was driven more by the sample 
of accidents the CFIT JSAT examined, since roughly 
50% of those occurred in the mountains. Certainly, if 
that were to be true for our larger sample of 1407 CFIT 
accidents, it would warrant the emphasis the CFIT 
JSAT and JSIT placed on it by including the develop-
ment of routes for GPS waypoints in mountain passes. 
Unfortunately, that data have yet to be examined fully.
CONCLUSIONS
Regardless of how one examines the data, using root 
cause analysis or a human error framework like HFACS, 
no single intervention will eliminate GA CFIT accidents. 
What is needed is a strategy that combines several inter-
ventions into a concerted effort. More important, a means 
to track intervention strategies is required to assess the 
viability of each recommended intervention on specific 
error forms – a proven quality of the HFACS framework.
It appears from our analysis that many, if not all, of the 
interventions developed by the CFIT JSAT and the ac-
companying implementation plan proposed by the CFIT 
JSIT will address many of the human error causal factors 
associated with GA CFIT accidents. If nothing else, this 
analysis provides further validation of the efforts of the 
two teams. Beyond simple validation, however, HFACS 
provides a means to track specific types of human error. 
What the CFIT JSAT and JSIT were unable to provide 
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is a listing of the specific types of human error commit-
ted by aircrew involved in CFIT. This analysis provides 
a benchmark of sorts that will enable the FAA and other 
safety organizations to track the effectiveness of these 
interventions on very specific error forms. If for instance, 
we do not see a significant trend downward in the number 
and percentage of CFIT accidents attributable to violations 
and personal readiness failures, we can re-evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the targeted intervention and modify it as 
needed. Better yet, rather than rely on an overall accident 
rate that is affected by a variety of things other than the 
specific interventions put in place to address CFIT, we can 
now focus specifically on CFIT accidents and those human 
errors most prevalent within the causal chain of events.
In summary, the analysis presented here represents 
a first look at the human error associated with GA 
CFIT accidents and is not the final word. While it does 
validate the findings of the GA CFIT JSAT and JSIT, 
it provides much more. In a sense, it puts a face on hu-
man error, particularly human error associated with 
CFIT that we simply did not have prior to the HFACS 
analysis. Now that we know what it looks like, we are 
in a better position to find it and cut it off at its roots.
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